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STICKS, STONES, AND SIMPLE TEASING:
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF NON-COGNIZABLE
HARASSING CONDUCT IN TLE CONTEXT OF
TITLE VII HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
CLAIMS
Sticks and stones will break my bones, but words will never
hurt me.1
Contrary to the children's rhyme, all insults, like sticks and
stones, can hurt, but this does not mean that all insults are
tortious.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Approximately two-thirds of all Title VII sexual harassment
claims in the United States circuit courts are dismissed when the
claim involves stray remarks. 3 The total number of sexual harass-
ment charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) and the Fair Employment Practices Agency has
gradually increased from 10,532 in 1992 to 15,618 in 1998. 4 With
this escalation in filings, courts increasingly face the complex task
of separating valid sexual harassment claims from conduct falling
1. THE CONCISE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS 212-13 (J. A. Simp-
son ed., 1983).
2. Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist, 161 F.3d 263, 270 (5th Cir. 1998).
3. I discovered this statistic by searching the Westlaw database that in-
cludes all federal appeals cases after 1944, using the following search terms:
"(stray w/1 remark) or (mere w/1 utterance!) or (simple w/1 teasing) and (sex!
w/1 harass!)." I eliminated cases that did not deal with sexual harassment in
the context of a hostile work environment I conducted this search on June 20,
1999.
4. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sexual
Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1992 - FY 1998 (last
modified Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html>.
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outside the scope of Title VII. This task is particularly challenging
in cases involving a claim of a hostile or abusive work environment
where the court must wrestle with subtle distinctions in order to
make a determination.
Courts recognize the existence of a hostile environment when
the alleged violator subjects the claimant to severe or pervasive har-
assment.5 For example, one court found severe and pervasive con-
duct when over a period of years a male employer raped a female
employee on several occasions, made repeated demands for sexual
intercourse to which she complied with approximately forty to fifty
times, fondled her, exposed himself to her, and followed her into the
women's restroom.6  Such egregious behavior presented the court
with an easy case of harassment.
However, cases more commonly involve less extreme forms of
conduct. For example, in Butler v. Ysleta Independent School Dis-
trict,7 the claimants received letters with statements such as "You
probably could use a man in your life to calm some of that frustration
down," "You are still trying to control everyone's life [sic]," and
"When you drive down the street you look like you're pissed off."8
Courts scrutinize facts like these in order to determine whether the
claimant has established a hostile work environment. Was the be-
havior severe or pervasive? Or were the incidents isolated and more
deserving of the labels "mere utterance" 9 and "simple teasing"10?
On May 24, 1999, the United States Supreme Court decided
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education," in which a fifth-grade
student sued her school under Title IX for failure to remedy a class-
mate's sexual harassment. 12 The Court revisited the issue of severe
and pervasive conduct, emphasizing that simple teasing is not action-
able because this behavior is expected of children. 3 Due to the
5. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
6. See id. at 60, 67.
7. 161 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1998).
8. Id. at 265. See discussion infra Part III.C.l.b.
9. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor,
477 U.S. at 67).
10. Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct 2275, 2283 (1998).
11. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
12. See id. at 1664.
13. See id. at 1675. The reader should note that the Court was discussing
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severity of the harassment and lack of response from school officials,
the Court ultimately found for the claimant.14 Yet, implicit within
the court's reasoning is the idea that members of society-whether at
school or work--should tolerate a certain level of name-calling.15
This Comment examines sexual harassment relegated to the
non-cognizable category of simple teasing. Part II provides back-
ground information by placing conduct labeled as stray remarks
within the larger context of sexual harassment. Part III criticizes ju-
dicial downplaying of the harm caused by simple teasing. Part IV
proposes the elimination of "play" as a factor for finding simple
teasing non-cognizable. Part V concludes with a discussion of the
potential impacts of implementing this proposal.
II. PLACING SIMPLE TEASING WITHIN TBE LARGER CONTEXT OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the use of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196416 for sexual harassment
claims in Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson.17 Severe or perva-
sive sexual harassment that alters the conditions of the victim's
employment and creates an abusive working environment violates
Title VII.18 In affecting a term or condition of employment, the sex-
ual harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to be
simple teasing in the grade school setting, explicitly contrasting the adult
workplace. See id. However, the discussion still reveals a wariness towards
allowing less severe forms of harassment to become actionable.
14. See id. at 1676.
15. See id. at 1675. "Indeed, at least early on, students are still learning
how to interact appropriately with their peers. It is thus understandable that, in
the school setting, students often engage in insults, banter, teasing, shoving,
pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the students subjected
to it." Id.
16. TitleVII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
17. See 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
18. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct 2275, 2283 (1998) (cit-
ingMeritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
136 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:133
actionable.' 9 The United States Supreme Court noted that the EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex20 emphasize the con-
sideration of the totality of the circumstances when assessing a sex-
ual harassment claim.
The conduct must be "(1) severe enough to alter the recipient's
workplace experience even though the conduct occurred but once or
but rarely, or (2) pervasive enough so as to be more than merely an
accidental or isolated event and thus to become a defining condition
of the workplace., 22  There is an inverse evidentiary relationship
between severity and pervasiveness.23 If the harassment is very se-
vere, the harasser does not need to repeat the activity for the conduct
to be cognizable. On the other hand, if the harassment occurs regu-
larly, the harasser need not to have acted in an extreme manner.
The sexual harassment in a hostile environment claim must be
severe or pervasive under both an objective and a subjective stan-
dard.24 In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the United States Su-
preme Court stated that "in order to be actionable under [Title VII], a
sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and
subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hos-
tile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be
SO." 2 5
Under the objective standard, "[c]onduct that is not severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview. 2, 6 Under the
subjective standard, "if the victim does not subjectively perceive the
environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the
19. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1998).
21. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
22. BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAw 175 (1992) (citations omitted).
23. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
24. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). A number
of commentators have also proposed a reasonable woman standard. See
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 22, at 181-84.
25. 118 S. Ct. at 2283 (citingfHarris, 510 U.S. at 21-22).
26. Harris, 510 U.S. at21.
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conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII
violation. 27
For example, in Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance,
Inc. ,28 the claimant testified that she felt "humiliated and upset by the
hostile nature of her supervisor's statements. ' 29 The court found that
this testimony satisfied the subjective part of the test.30 A claimant is
not required to show a tangible job detriment resulting from abusive
conduct.31 The court added that it was sufficient that the claimant
testified that the abusive comments were "intolerable, publicly made,
and caused humiliation and a loss of self-respect. ' 32 The subjective
element poses a minor hurdle for claimants.
In the Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 33 the
EEOC recommends looking "at the record as a whole and at the to-
tality of the circumstances. 34 In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,35
the United States Supreme Court listed a number of factors for de-
termining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the sexual
harassment is severe or pervasive. 36 These factors include "the fre-
quency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work per-
formance., 37 However, the Court emphasized that "no single factor
is required., 38 In addition, "courts should not consider each incident
of harassment in isolation. Rather, a court must evaluate the sum
total of abuse over time.,
39
27. Id. at 21-22.
28. 129 F.3d 1408 (10th Cir. 1997).
29. Id. at 1413.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1998).
34. Id.
35. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
36. See id. at 23; see also Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2283 (reaffirming these
factors).
37. Harris, 510 U.S. at23.
38. Id.
39. DurhamLife Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1999) (cita-
tion omitted).
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The analysis of harassing conduct involves policy considera-
tions. The inquiry into severity and pervasiveness necessarily "re-
quires a balance between the complainant's right to be free from
sexual offense and the fact that the law does not address every dis-
comfort and trivial offense., 40 Accordingly, the question is one of
fact that depends on the totality of the circumstances. 4'
One of the factors examined is the frequency of the discrimina-
tory conduct. For example, "[u]nless the conduct is quite severe, a
single incident or isolated incidents of offensive sexual conduct will
not create an abusive environment. 42 Thus, conduct that is not se-
vere requires a showing of repeated activity. 43 In this way, incidents
may be aggregated to establish pervasiveness.44 "Although some
dicta state that only repeated harassment is actionable, no case seems
to have held that a single act of severe harassment will necessarily be
too isolated to be actionable.
45
Another factor in the totality of the circumstances is the severity
of the discriminatory conduct. "Some forms of unwelcome sexual
conduct are so trivial that they are not actionable., 46 As the severity
increases, the need for pervasiveness decreases. 47 "In determining
whether the conduct has created a hostile environment, courts con-
sider the cumulative effect of various incidents of sexual harass-
ment.
'548
An additional consideration is whether the harassing conduct
interferes with an employee's ability to work. Interference, though,
need not rise to the level of the harasser inflicting concrete
40. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 22, at 185.
41. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 49 (Christine Godsil Cooper ed., Supp. 1997) (citations
omitted).
42. LNDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 22, at 177.
43. See id.
44. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 41, at 42.
45. Id.
46. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 22, at 178 (citation omitted).
47. See id. (citation omitted).
48. LINDIEMANN & KADUE, supra note 41, at 44 (citation omitted).
November 1999] STICKS, STONES, AND SIMPLE TEASING 139
psychological harm on the victim.49 "[S]exual harassment is action-
able whenever it unreasonably interferes with 'work perform-
ance.' 50 However, because unreasonable interference is only a fac-
tor"... Title VII does not require proof that the harassment actually
interfered with work performance.",
51
The United States Supreme Court has set the lower threshold of
cognizability above a "mere utterance. 512  The Court stated that
"'simple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the
'terms and conditions of employment.' 53 Thus, stray remarks lay at
one end of the spectrum with severe or pervasive sexual harassment
at the other.
III. JUDICIAL DOWNPLAYING OF SIMPLE TEASING
Courts have been caught in a judicial quandary in deciding when
to find a stray remark actionable. In part, this is due to the design of
the Title VII statute. Other factors that contribute to the courts' con-
fusion may be understood through the lens of feminist legal theory.
This section looks to the language of opinions to explain why courts
tend to downplay the significance of stray remarks.
A. Walking the Title VII Tightrope
With regard to the purpose of Title VII, there are two competing
principles. On the one hand, the EEOC emphasizes that "Title VII
does not proscribe all conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace.,
54
Within this consideration lies the idea that the statute should not
be turned into a "general civility code." 55 Thus, courts do not find
49. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
50. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 22, at 185-86.
51. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 41, at 50 (citation omitted).
52. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2283 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,
238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
53. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80
(1998)).
54. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, POLICY GUIDANCE ON
CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990), reprinted in LINDEMANN
& KADUE, supra note 22, app.3, at 661.
55. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); see
Faragher, 118 S. Ct at 2283-84.
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every stray remark or mere utterance as actionable sexual harass-
ment.
On the other hand, Congress designed Title VII to sweep
broadly. The language of the statute
evinces a Congressional intention to define discrimination
in the broadest possible terms. Congress chose neither to
enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to eluci-
date in extenso the parameter of such nefarious activities.
Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom by being unconstric-
tive, knowing that constant change is the order of our day
and that the seemingly reasonable practices of the present
can easily become the injustices of the morrow.
56
Title VH is stated broadly in order to promote "workplace equal-
ity."557 As a result, the EEOC seeks to eliminate "[u]nwelcome sex-
ual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature ... when ... such conduct has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work-
ing environment.
' 58
The idea that courts should not construe Title VII too broadly or
too narrowly is linked to the aim of the statute. The primary objec-
tive of Title VII "is not to provide redress but to avoid harm"59 Em-
phasizing this goal, the EEOC expressly states that "[p]revention is
the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment.,
60
B. Harms of Simple Teasing
In their treatise Sexual Harassment in Employment Law, Barbara
Lindemann and David Kadue reveal some facts about sexual harass-
ment:
56. Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238
(5th Cir. 1971) (discussing harassment in the context of ethnic discrimination).
57. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
58. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11 (a)(3) (1998).
59. Faragher, 118 S. Ct at 2292 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
60. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f).
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(1) A majority of working women believe that they have
been sexually harassed in the workplace. Women's advo-
cates have characterized harassment as the most widespread
problem faced by women in the work force.
(4) Sexual harassment in its severest forms (physical con-
duct, retaliatory discharges) tends almost exclusively to be
practiced by men against women.
(8) Women often remain silent when confronted with sex-
ual harassment even while suffering physically, economi-
cally, and pyschologically [sic].
61
Feminist legal theorists have developed models that attempt to ex-
plain these facts. Catharine MacKinnon, Kathryn Abrams, and Vicki
Schultz provide a sampling of some of these insights.
1. Dominance over women
One model examined to determine the harm caused by stray re-
marks focuses on power. Catharine MacKinnon explains her domi-
nance approach as follows: "In this approach, an equality question is
a question of the distribution of power. Gender is also a question of
power, specifically of male supremacy and female subordination.
62
Under this theory, stray remarks reinforce the power imbalance
in the workplace. The court in Bundy v. Jackson63 acknowledged
this problem by noting that "so long as the sexual situation is con-
structed with enough coerciveness, subtlety, suddenness, or one-
sidedness to negate the effectiveness of the woman's refusal... she
is not considered to have been sexually harassed. ' 64 In the context of
rape, MacKinnon proposed that "sexuality [can be understood] as a
61. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 22, at 4-7 (citations omitted).
62. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Dis-
crimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND
GENDER 87 (Katharine T. Bartlett et al. eds., 1991).
63. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 945-46 (referring to CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 46-47 (1979)).
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social sphere of male power of which forced sex is paradigmatic. ' 65
Her description equally applies in workplaces infested with stray re-
marks.
Thus, the harm is the continued domination of men over women
through the use of simple teasing. A barb about a co-worker's sexual
proclivities, for example, undoubtedly bruises the individual on the
receiving end. However, the damage extends beyond one person's
hurt feelings by rippling into the larger societal construct of unequal
power.
66
2. Failing to recognize women's difference in experience
Another useful framework for analyzing the impact of stray re-
marks is to examine women's difference in experience. Kathryn
Abrams explains that "[o]ne principal reason for the pervasiveness of
sexual harassment in the workplace is that men regard conduct,
ranging from sexual demands to sexual innuendo, differently than
women do."67 As a result, what may be normal sexual conduct for
some men is highly offensive to some women. 68
Anita Bernstein found that "men are relatively likely to feel
flattered or amused, whereas women are relatively likely to feel
frightened or insulted, by sex-related behavior or displays at work.,
69
65. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y
635 (1983), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND
GENDER 181, 187 (Katharine T. Bartlett et al. eds., 1991).
66. As MacKinnon puts it
[feminism's] project is to uncover and claim as valid the experience of
women, the major content of which is the devalidation of women's
experience.
This defines our task not only because male dominance is perhaps
the most pervasive and tenacious system of power in history, but be-
cause it is metaphysically nearly perfect Its point of view is the stan-
dard for point-of-viewlessness, its particularity the meaning of univer-
sality.
Id. at 182 (footnote omitted).
67. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1202 (1989).
68. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 22, at 5 (citations omitted).
69. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARv.
L. REv. 445, 465-66 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
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Abrams describes this as a difference in experience.7 ° Men tend to
undervalue uncomfortable feelings created by aggressive or sexual
behavior.71 As they are usually the aggressor, they often may not
empathize with victims of aggression. In addition, men generally
exercise greater control over workplaces than women.7 3  Conse-
quently, male "views of sexual behavior in the workplace remain the
norm, the measure of 'business as usual. ,,
74
As for women, their experiences as a group give them a differ-
ent perspective. 75 Abrams discusses the "distinctive feelings women
have about their role in the workplace,, 76 which stem from various
factors such as being "comparative newcomers to many kinds of
work"'77 to usually occupying the "lower rungs of most professional
hierarchies. ' 7 8 Abrams also points to women's differing attitudes
about sex as a reason that women have a different perspective about
sexual conduct in the workplace.7 9 The prevalence of rape and por-
nography, women's vulnerability to sexual coercion and greater sen-
sitivity to sexual conduct, Abrams argues, all contribute to these dif-
fering attitudes.8 0
Since women as a group regard sexual conduct differently than
their male counterparts, stray remarks can cause particularized harm.
"Sexual inquiries, jokes, remarks, or innuendoes ... have the effect
of reminding a woman that she is viewed as an object of sexual
70. See Abrams, supra note 67, at 1203.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1202-03.
73. See id. at 1203.
74. Id.
75. The court in Ellison v. Brady recognized this difference in perspective
and incorporated in its opinion Abrams's argument for the adoption of a rea-
sonable woman standard. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir.
1991). Abrams, though, was wary of what the adoption of a reasonable
woman standard would represent She noted that "[e]ven a reasonable woman
standard, when it is not carefully elaborated by a discussion of the differences
between men and women, may reflect less an effort to see beyond the male
perspective, than an attempt to evoke a woman who is, in Henry Higgins's
words, 'more like a man."' Abrams, supra note 67, at 1202.
76. Abrams, supra note 67, at 1204.
77. Id. (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. (footnotes omitted).
79. See id. at 1205.
80. See id.
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derision rather than as a credible coworker."s' Another harm result-
ing from their attitudes toward sex is that women can feel sexually
coerced by a suggestive comment.
82
3. Undermining the competence of women
A third approach for understanding why stray remarks cause
injury examines how these statements undermine the competence of
women. Vicki Schultz argues that "[h]arassment has the form and
function of denigrating women's competence for the purpose of
keeping them away from male-dominated jobs or incorporating them
as inferior, less capable workers., 83 Men categorically harass others
more often than women do. Abusive comments by men are an ex-
pression of "idealized masculinity" in response to perceived threats
from female and less masculine male workers.84
Schultz proposes that the courts look beyond stray remarks as
merely sexual advances. 85 Rather than "appeal[ing] to judges to
protect women's sexual virtue or sensibilities," harassment law
should be used "to promote women's empowerment and equality as
workers., 86 The workplace represents one of the most important
battlefronts because of its "pivotal role in producing gender inequal-
ity between men and women." 87
Undermining the competence of women works harm in specific
ways. Miranda Oshige, a student commentator, enumerated a few of
these methods. 88 For example, flirting can be seen as demeaning in
effect and an unnecessary interference with work.89 Sexual conduct
can also "decrease[] women's productivity and their job satisfaction
81. Id. at 1208.
82. See id. at 1207.
83. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J.
1683, 1755 (1998).
84. Id. at 1762.
85. See id. at 1729.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1756. Schultz does not limit the victims of this workplace dy-
namic to women, but includes men who may not fit into the traditionally mas-
culine role. See id. at 1757.
88. See Miranda Oshige, Note, What's Sex Got to Do with It?, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 565 (1995).
89. See id. at 573.
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and impose[] barriers on their ability to excel as workers."90 The fact
that men as a group tend to occupy higher positions in the manage-
ment structure further increases the harm. Oshige notes that "being
asked for a date may put a subordinate in a very uncomfortable
situation, and being complimented on physical appearance may make
a woman feel that her appearance garners more attention than her
work."91
C. Shortcomings of the Current Jurisprudence for Simple Teasing
Courts undervalue the harm of stray remarks in two ways. First,
courts have created an unspoken requirement that stray remarks be
linked to an actual injury. Second, courts excuse playful stray re-
marks from their scope of inquiry. In Indest v. Freeman Decorating,
Inc. ,92 Judge Jones acknowledged that "there is a continuum of sexu-
ally-categorized behavior ranging from the use of diminutives like
'sweetie-pie' on one extreme to physical assault on the other, and the
commingling of particular conduct, words and working environments
may form a complex stew. 93
Beyond this acknowledgement, however, courts provide little
guidance for determining where in the spectrum diminutives end and
assault begins. In attempting to separate the ingredients of the
"complex stew," this subsection dissects sexual harassment cases ac-
cording to the type of harm involved-physical or emotional.
1. Simple teasing coupled with physical harm
a. actual physical contact
Stray remarks accompanied by actual physical contact provide
the easiest case for courts to find actionable sexual harassment. Ex-
amples of physical contact that raise stray remarks to the level of
cognizability range from aggressive conduct to sexual groping.
Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc.94 provides an illustration of aggres-
sive conduct in the form of a customer grabbing the hair of Lockard,
90. Id. at 575 (footnotes omitted).
91. Id. at585.
92. 164 F.3d 258 (5thCir. 1999).
93. Id. at 264 n.8.
94. 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).
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a waitress at Pizza Hut.95 Prior to this incident, the customer and his
friend had come into the restaurant on several occasions.96 Lockard
testified that they had often "made 'filthy' comments to her such as
'I would like to get into your pants.' 97 On the evening of the inci-
dent, Lockard seated the customers and then".., one of the custom-
ers commented that she smelled good and asked what kind of co-
logne she was wearing. Ms. Lockard responded that it was none of
his business, and the customer grabbed her by the hair.",98 This ag-
gressive behavior contributed to the court's finding of severe con-
duct.99
Lockard also presents an example of sexual groping. 00 After
being ordered by her manager to continue serving the two customers,
Lockard returned to their table with their beer.' 10 "As she reached to
put the beer on the table, the customer pulled her to him by the hair,
grabbed her breast, and put his mouth on her breast."'0 2 The hair
grabbing and the breast groping allowed the court to conclude that
the customers' conduct was "more than a mere offensive utter-
ance."'103 Although the incidents were relatively isolated, the con-
duct was "severe enough to create an actionable hostile work envi-
ronment.'
10 4
Another example of sexual contact combined with a remark is
found in Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans.'0 5 A male office
manager "grabbed [his insurance agent's] buttocks from behind
while she was bending over her files and told her that she smelled
good.' ' 10 6 This incident factored heavily into the court's finding of
an abusive work environment.'1 7 Although arriving at the correct
95. See id. at 1067.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 1072.
98. Id. at 1067.
99. See id. at 1072.
100. See id. at 1067.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1072.
104. Id.
105. 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 146.
107. See id. at 155.
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result, the Lockard and Durham courts have set the bar very high for
finding a stray remark cognizable.
On the other hand, non-cognizable stray remarks accompanied
by actual physical contact sometimes lack pervasiveness and sever-
ity. In the context of same-gender harassment, the United States Su-
preme Court has characterized this sort of behavior as "roughhous-
ing."108  In the opposite-gender context, the physical contact is
usually isolated and brief. For example, in Adusumilli v. City of Chi-
cago,10 9 the court found that "the most serious misconduct, the un-
wanted touching of Adusumilli's buttocks, took the relatively mild
form of a poke and occurred only once.""1
0
The Adusumilli court misses the mark on two points. First, by
placing emphasis on the frequency of the harassment, the court trivi-
alizes an incident that only occurred once. Second, the court implies
that playful behavior cannot constitute sexual harassment. When
contrasted with the findings of harassment in Lockard"' and Dur-
ham," 2 the unspoken rule becomes clear. The courts prohibit physi-
cal or sexual assault, but allow flirtatious contact. Moreover, an ut-
terance needs to be accompanied by conduct rising to the level of
physical or sexual assault before the courts will recognize the com-
ment as harassment. Only unusually extreme circumstances will get
the courts' attention.
b. threat ofphysical contact
The threat of physical contact or intimidation does not involve
actual physical contact. For example, in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.," 3 the court considers as a factor for finding an abusive envi-
ronment whether the conduct is "physically threatening" as opposed
to merely being offensive. 1 4 This factor places emphasis on the
subjective element of the severe or pervasive analysis.
108. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
109. 164 F.3d 353 (7thCir. 1998).
110. Id. at362.
111. 162 F.3d at 1072.
112. 166 F.3dat 155.
113. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
114. Id. at 23.
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In Hathaway v. Runyon," 5 Hathaway was an employee of the
postal service and Norris was her coworker.' 6 During work, Norris
placed himself physically close to Hathaway and told her that other
workers believed they were romantically involved. 17 On two occa-
sions, Norris sexually touched her." 8 After Hathaway told him to
stop, Norris and another coworker, Wynn, began to laugh, snicker,
and make suggestive noises at her." 9 This activity continued for
eight months.'
The court found that Norris and Wynn's conduct toward the
claimant caused her to be "frightened and intimidated."' 2 ' The
claimant "testified that she was terrified to pass within grabbing
range of [both of her coworkers] and that she felt trapped when they
blocked her exit from the narrow label room.', 22 In part, the court
based its finding of abusive working conditions on the claimant's
feelings toward her coworkers' intimidating presence.
123
Although the two touching incidents no doubt contributed to her
claim, the court spent a large part of its analysis focusing on Norris's
and Wynn's non-physical conduct and its effect on Hathaway. The
court may have feared that conduct like Norris's initial touching
of Hathaway's buttocks124 would escalate into more physically or
sexually aggressive behavior. Hence, the court emphasized that
Hathaway was "frightened and intimidated,'1 5 "terrified,"'126 " that
she felt trapped,' 27 and "was the victim of menacing sex-based
115. 132 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1997).
116. See id. at 1217.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1222. On one occasion, Norris "hit her on the buttocks with a
clipboard while they were together in an enclosed stairwell." Id. at 1217. The
other incident involved Norris "approach[ing] her from behind and squeez[ing]
her buttocks while she was waiting for an elevator." Id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 1222.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 1217.
125. Id. at 1222.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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treatment.' 1 28 Similar to the context of actual physical contact, the
threat of physical harm must rise to a very high level before the court
can find sexual harassment.
Courts have refused to recognize stray remarks when the physi-
cal threat is not sufficiently severe or pervasive. An example of this
bias can be seen in Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts.
129
Shepherd, the claimant, was employed by the Comptroller of Public
Accounts of the State of Texas. 30 Moore, the alleged harasser, was
one of Shepherd's coworkers.'
According to Shepherd's deposition, on one occasion
Moore stood in front of Shepherd's desk and remarked
"your elbows are the same color as your nipples." Shep-
herd testified that Moore remarked once "you have big
thighs" while he simulated looking under her dress. Shep-
herd claimed Moore stood over her desk on several occa-
sions and attempted to look down her clothing. According
to Shepherd, Moore touched her arm on several occasions,
rubbing one of his hands from her shoulder down to her
wrist while standing beside her. Shepherd alleged addition-
ally that on two occasions, when Shepherd looked for a seat
.;e .. Moore patted his lap and remarked "here's your
seat."3
The court failed to find an abusive work environment because the in-
cidents lacked severity.133 The court reasoned that "the comments
made by Moore were boorish and offensive," but not severe. 134 The
remarks were mere utterances, which did not rise to the level of sex-
ual harassment.
35
In part of its analysis, the court agreed with the lower court's as-
sessment that the conduct was "too tepid to amount to actionable
harassment.' 36 The court explained that "[n]one of Moore's actions
128. Id.
129. 168 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1999).
130. See id. at 872.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 874.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
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physically threatened Shepherd.' 37 This statement mirrors the lan-
guage found in Hathaway, in which the court focused on the fear and
intimidation felt by the claimant. 38 The potential for physical or
sexual assault was not present in Shepherd, and thus the environment
was not hostile.
Furthermore, in labeling Moore's conduct as "boorish,' 39 the
court seemed to indicate that the alleged harasser was merely un-
couth in his attempts at flirtation. At the end of the facts describing
the alleged harassment, the court added that Shepherd "engaged in
friendly discussions with Moore on almost a daily basis and had a
friendly relation with him at work and outside of work.' ' 14 Under
these circumstances, Moore appears to have been only teasing Shep-
herd. Again, the notion of playfulness surfaces. Conduct that can be
characterized as play cannot constitute sexual harassment.
Butler v. Ysleta Independent School District'4 ' presents another
case where the court made similar findings. Gracia and Butler, who
were teachers in an elementary school, received anonymous mail-
ings. 142 The content of the mailings varied from notes with state-
ments such as "You probably could use a man in your life to calm
some of that frustration down"' 43 and "When you drive down the
street you look like you're pissed off,"' 44 to a greeting card contain-
ing a picture of the naked buttocks of four women with a caption
stating that "the winner is you (for being the perfect asshole).' 45
The local authorities subsequently discovered that the school princi-
pal sent the mailings.
The court found that the work environment was not hostile. 46
One of the reasons that led to the court's conclusion was that the let-
ters arrived infrequently. 147 The court explained as follows: "Even
137. Id.
138. See 132 F.3dat 1222.
139. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874.
140. Id. at 872.
141. 161 F.3d 263 (Sth Cir. 1998).
142. See id. at 265.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 269.
147. See id.
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occasional anonymous letters can be frightening, and irregular re-
ceipt of such letters may be even more disarming than letters that ar-
rive like clockwork and become an expected nuisance for which the
victim may be prepared .... Nonetheless, the frequency factor af-
fords plaintiffs little or no support."' 148 The court seemed to imply
that the timing of the mailings failed to instill a sufficient degree of
fear in the recipients. Because the letters were spaced out over a pe-
riod of a school year, their intimidating effect was de minimis.
49
Another reason the court gave for not finding an abusive work
environment was that the statements in the letters were not threaten-
ing. 50 The court linked its analysis to the previous reason in sup-
posing the following:
The anonymity of a letter may itself make it threatening,
even if the content is innocuous. A threatening statement,
such as "I am watching you," is more threatening still when
the author is unknown. But here, the anonymous notes had
no threatening content whatsoever. At worst, a reasonable
person receiving such messages could be afraid that some-
one dislikes her and objectifies her. We do not diminish the
hurt that comes with such knowledge, but we do not find
that it supports a finding that a workplace environment is
hostile. 5'
Although sympathetic to the teachers' plight, the court was only able
to gauge the impact of the letters in terms of whether they suggest
pending physical harm. Without a threat, the letters were "innocu-
ous,"'52 like the "tepid" advances of the alleged harasser in Shep-
herd. 1 3 Standing alone, the stray remarks in both Shepherd and
Butler were unable to sustain sexual harassment claims. 154
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id. In addition, the court found that the conduct was not severe and
did not interfere with the teachers' work performances. See id. at 270. The
reasons for these findings will be discussed in more detail below. See infra
Part lII.C.2.b.
151. Butler, 161 F.3d at 269-70.
152. Id. at269.
153. 168 F.3d at 874.
154. See id. at 874; Butler, 161 F.3d at 269.
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2. Simple teasing coupled with emotional harm
a. psychological injury
Courts have also recognized stray remarks as creating an abu-
sive work environment when psychological injury is present. This
type of non-physical conduct may involve both psychological or
emotional damage. Actual psychological damage forms the far end
of the spectrum, exemplified by a claimant suffering a "nervous
breakdown."'"5 The United States Supreme Court has made it clear
that a "tangible psychological injury" is not required. 156 Neverthe-
less, similar to the cases involving actual physical contact, actual
psychological damage eases the level of severity and pervasiveness
needed for courts to find a hostile work environment.
In Lockard, in which two customers made sexual comments and
grabbed the waitress's hair, and one of them put her breast in his
mouth, 157 the court found relevant that Ms. Lockard suffered psy-
chological harm 158 At trial,
Ms. Lockard testified she was frightened to be near men,
even her father and her husband, and that her condition pre-
vented her from working. Several family members testified
to changes in Ms. Lockard's behavior as a result of the in-
cident, including her fear of going out in public. Ms.
Lockard sought psychological counseling from Dr. Karen
Rasile, who appeared as an expert witness at trial and stated
that Ms. Lockard exhibited classic symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder and major depression.' 59
The combination of the customers' conduct and the resulting harm
led the court to conclude that there was "more than a mere offensive
utterance.' 160 Lockard was thus able to establish an abusive work
environment. 161
155. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
156. Id. at21.
157. See 162 F.3d at 1067.
158. See id. at 1072.
159. Id. at 1068.
160. Id. at 1072.
161. See id.
152
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The United States Supreme Court in Harris declared that the
standard for an abusive working environment "takes a middle path
between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and
requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."'1
62
At the same time, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he effect on the
employee's psychological well-being is ... relevant to determining
whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive."'
63
Thus, although psychological harm is only considered to be one rele-
vant factor in the determination, 64 the actual showing of psychologi-
cal harm helps boost a claim of harassment to a necessary level of of-
fensiveness.
The Lockard court no doubt understood the standard. However,
the court calling attention to Lockard's mental suffering in the state-
ment of facts and in the analysis of the sexual harassment suggests
that less weight may have been given to the sexual comments them-
selves. Consequently, a court attempting to follow the Lockard
holding would interpret the relevant facts as only those relating to the
physical assault and the psychological harm. The stray remarks are
diminished to a point where they do not form part of the inquiry.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court's proclamation that "Title
VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous
breakdown"'165 holds little meaning.
b. emotional injury
Even without the need for psychological counseling, courts have
recognized that stray remarks may result in an abusive work envi-
ronment. The United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson166 indicated that "Title VII affords employees
the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimi-
dation, ridicule, and insult.' 67 Humiliation is a key element. In
Harris, the Court pointed to whether conduct is "humiliating, or a
162. Harris, 510 U.S. at21.
163. Id. at23.
164. See id.; see also Hathaway, 132 F.3d at 1223 (noting that psychological
harm is relevant to the inquiry).
165. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
166. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
167. Id. at 65.
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mere offensive utterance" as relevant to finding a hostile environ-
ment.
168
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.'69 is a case involving offen-
sive utterances. Steiner was a blackjack dealer in a casino supervised
by Trenkle, the vice-president. 170 Trenkle called Steiner names, such
as "dumb fucking broad," and "cunt.''17 After Steiner had given
complimentary restaurant passes to some customers, Trenkle yelled,
"Why don't you go in the restaurant and suck their dicks while you
are at it . . . ?,172 To another employee, Trenkle said, "I wouldn't
want you to lose your job ... because you have got big boobs."'
173
These facts presented a simple case for the court to find sexual
harassment. 174 Besides being sexually explicit and highly deroga-
tory, the court noted that the comments were "publicly made."'
175
The court found this fact significant because, in quoting the language
of Harris, "while a 'mere offensive utterance' might not create a
hostile environment, conduct which is 'humiliating' is more likely to
do SO.
'5176
Because the feeling of humiliation is often dependent on the
presence of others, 177 courts take notice of the setting in which the
harassing conduct occurs. In Smith v. Northwest Financial Accep-
tance, Inc.,178 Mangus, the supervisor, told the employee "(1) to 'get
a little this weekend' so she would 'come back in a better mood,'
.. (2) that Plaintiff 'would be the worst piece of ass that I ever
had,' . . . and (3) that Plaintiff 'must be a sad piece of ass' who
'can't keep a man,' . . . 179
168. 510 U.S. at23.
169. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
170. See id. at 1461.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1462.
174. See id. at 1464.
175. Id. at 1463.
176. Id.
177. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 552 (1979) (defining
"humiliate" as "to reduce to a lower position in one's own eyes or others'
eyes").
178. 129 F.3d 1408 (10th Cir. 1997).
179. Id. at 1414 (citations omitted).
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The court found this to be a hostile work environment. 8 ° The
setting played a pivotal role in the analysis:
Plaintiff was subjected to Mr. Mangus' comments in the in-
timate setting of her Casper, Wyoming, office. Because the
office was a relatively small, open space without partitions
or walls, Plaintiffs co-workers could hear Mr. Mangus'
remarks and occasionally witness his treatment of Plaintiff.
This public setting only increased the humiliation, and,
therefore, the severity of the discriminatory conduct. 8'
Additionally, in Durham, where the court also found sexual harass-
ment, one of the relevant facts was the failure of the management to
honor the insurance agent at an awards dinner, even though she was
the top-producer.'82 The agent "felt that she had been humiliated in
front of her colleagues and her son, who was also present. ,183 Simi-
larly, in Butler, the court noted that anonymous letters to teachers
would have been more severe had they been publicly circulated.
18 4
The degree of humiliation necessary before a stray remark is
elevated to sexual harassment picks up where psychological harm
leaves off. Courts fear that Title VII would be turned into a "general
civility code."' 85  Courts have reacted by making it clear that
"[d]iscourtesy or rudeness" do not count as sexual harassment.'
86
Actual degradation, like actual psychological injury, provides a
touchstone, lessening the burden of analysis. This approach, how-
ever, leaves claimants injured by non-humiliating stray remarks with
non-cognizable claims.
Which forms of humiliation fall short of the mark? In Oncale,
the United States Supreme Court indicated that "ordinary socializing
in the workplace" 87 and "intersexual flirtatione"88 fall outside the
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. See 166 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1999).
183. Id.
184. See 161 F.3d at 269.
185. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80; see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct.
2275, 2283-84 (1998).
186. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1999).
187. 523 U.S. at 81. See supra Part II.A discussing the broad principles and
policies of Title VII.
188. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
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scope of Title VII. The recurring language in this context is "simple
teasing. ' 89
In Adusumilli v. City of Chicago,'90 Adusumilli worked as an
administrative assistant in a police station.' 9' Various co-workers
were responsible for the allegedly harassing behavior. 192 Her super-
visor advised her that "to avoid being laughed at, she should break
her banana in the middle rather than eating it whole."' 193 A police of-
ficer told her to "wash a banana before she ate it."'194 Another officer
suggested that she not wave at squad cars "because people would
think she was a prostitute."' 95 Three officers also stared at her
breasts on separate occasions.196 Additionally, Adusumilli overheard
a conversation where a male officer asked a female officer "if [she]
had worn a low-neck top the night before."'
197
In this instance, the court found that Adusumilli did not suffer
sexual harassment. 98 In reviewing the remarks made by those
around her, the court decided that Adusumilli "complains of no more
than teasing."' 99 The kidding and flirtatious nature of the comments
reduced their stature to harmless stray remarks, similar to the stature
given to "poor taste and a lack of professionalism.
200
Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.201 elaborates on the idea of
fun in the workplace: "Incidental, occasional or merely playful sex-
ual utterances will rarely poison the employee's working conditions
to the extent demanded for liability.220 ' The court echoes the Su-
preme Court's tone and takes the idea one step further. In setting a
novel standard for acceptable behavior at work, the court commented
189. Id. at82.
190. 164 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1998).
191. See id. at357.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at362.
199. Id. at361.
200. Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 155 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir.
1998).
201. 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
202. Id. at 264.
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that the alleged harasser's "vulgar remarks and innuendos (about his
own anatomy) were no more offensive than sexual jokes regularly
told on major network television programs.,
203
Title VII does not reach "genuine but innocuous differences in
the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the
same sex and of the opposite sex.",204 In much simpler language, the
courts seem to be saying, "All work and no play makes Jack a dull
boy.
205
IV. ELIMNATING PLAY AS AN EXCUSE
Stray remarks may cause harm, yet courts have trouble deline-
ating which remarks should be actionable absent physical or psy-
chological injury. The line can be drawn around "play." Courts
should eliminate play as a factor for finding stray remarks non-
cognizable. In other words, in analyzing the conduct of the harasser,
a finding of merely playful behavior should not serve as an excuse
because of lack in severity. Rather, play resulting in an unreasonable
interference with an employee's work performance adds to an abu-
sive work environment. This would reserve the "workplace" as a
place intended for work.
The previous cases discussed would reach different results if
play were not considered as a factor for finding a stray remark non-
cognizable. In Adusumilli v. City of Chicago,20 6 the court found that
the harassing conduct lacked severity because "Adusumilli com-
plains of no more than teasing about waving at squad cars, ambigu-
ous comments about bananas, rubber bands, and low-neck tops,
staring and attempts to make eye contact, and four isolated incidents
in which a co-worker briefly touched her arm, fingers, or but-
tocks. '20
7
203. Id. The comments themselves are strangely absent from the court's
opinion.
204. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
205. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF
PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROvERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT
AND MODERN LITERATURE 246 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
206. 164 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1998).
207. Id. at 361.
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Instead of discounting the incidents as too insubstantial because
of their playful nature, the court should have determined the appro-
priateness of the conduct given the nature of the setting. All of the
incidents occurred in the police station in which Adusumilli
worked.20 8 The alleged harassers, which consisted of police officers
209and Adusumilli's supervisor, were men in positions of authority.
By considering the totality of the circumstances, the alleged viola-
tors' playful behavior was inappropriate and constituted an unrea-
sonable interference with Adusumilli's work performance.
Similarly, in Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts, the
court addressed the playful nature of the conduct. 210 Shepherd's co-
worker commented on her nipples and thighs, attempted to look un-
der her dress and down her shirt, referred to his lap as her seat, and
rubbed her arms from her shoulders down to her wrist on several oc-
casions. 211 During this time, Shepherd received "an unfavorable
evaluation of her work product., 212 In refusing to find an abusive
work environment, the court characterized the comments as "boorish
and offensive. 213 Rather than end the analysis on that note, the
court ought to have continued. The court should have concluded that
boorish and offensive conduct was inappropriate in the workplace
and caused actual harm to Shepherd's work performance. Therefore,
the teasing created an abusive work environment.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem is that playful stray remarks cause harm but are not
actionable as a violation of Title VII. The solution is to discard the
excuse that the alleged harasser was simply teasing.
This proposal solves the problem both by furthering the policy
goals of Title VII and by accommodating the concerns of Title VII
claimants. Congress designed Title VII to promote workplace
equality without sweeping too broadly or too narrowly. In other
208. See id. at 357.
209. See id.
210. 168 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1999).
211. See id. at 872.
212. Id. at 873.
213. Id. at 874.
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words, Congress wanted to rid the workplace of harassment, but at
the same time, not turn the statute into a general civility code.
Disallowing as an excuse the playfulness of a remark does not
open the floodgates to litigation by punishing every incivility.
Rather, the proposal helps courts distinguish between impolite be-
havior and sexual harassment. In weeding out harassing behavior,
Title VII focuses on prevention rather than punishment. Violators
will learn that subtle forms of harassment can no longer slip through
undetected. Victims will be reassured that the workplace is indeed a
safe place to work.
Thus, re-characterizing playful stray remarks as a factor for
finding sexual harassment will provide additional comfort to claim-
ants. At the same time, the impact of the proposal on existing law
would be minimal. The proposal does not change the law, but rather
adds precision to the analysis of harassing conduct. If courts fear
that this proposal would put too much of a damper on socializing, an
alternative might be to institute recess at work.
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